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Abstract: This book chapter describes the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the
ongoing financial crisis. The chapter first explains the hybrid public-private nature of
Fannie and Freddie, which are what is known as Government Sponsored Enterprises
(GSEs). Fannie and Freddie were originally chartered by the federal government to
create a national mortgage market. The chapter then explains how the two GSEs
morphed into extraordinarily large companies that profited enormously from their special
relationship with the federal government, while providing only modest benefits to
American homeowners. In what turned out to be a disastrous trade-off for American
taxpayers, Fannie and Freddie ended up needing a bailout measured in the hundreds of
billions of dollars. Ultimately, Fannie and Freddie exhibited the common failings of poor
GSE design—after fulfilling their original purpose, they took on monstrously large lives
of their own that defied political oversight. The chapter concludes that Fannie and
Freddie should be privatized, with their remaining public functions assumed by pure
government actors.

David Reiss*
Brooklyn Law School
FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: PRIVATIZING PROFIT
AND SOCIALIZING LOSS
As part of its response to the ongoing credit crisis, in the fall of 2008 the federal
government placed the Federal National Mortgage Association (typically referred to as
“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association (typically referred to
as “Freddie Mac”) in conservatorship. While they are for-profit, privately owned
mortgage finance companies whose shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are also two of the few companies directly chartered by
Congress, so called Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). The federal government
has given them the mission of providing liquidity and stability to the United States
residential mortgage market and achieving certain affordable housing goals.
The privileges attendant to this special relationship with the federal government
allowed Fannie and Freddie to pass on certain savings to American homeowners but also
to extract monopoly profits in the American residential mortgage market. Meanwhile,
their hybrid public-private status enabled them to exert outsized political influence and
drive much of the legislative and regulatory agenda regarding their own fates. Thus
while Freddie and Fannie’s early success made the U.S.’s secondary residential mortgage

*

Professor, Brooklyn Law School. This article is based in part on earlier articles by the author, including
The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam
Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV., p. 1019 (2008); The Role of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Duopoly
in the American Housing Market, 17 J. OF FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE XXX (forthcoming 2009), available at:
http://works.bepress.com/david_reiss/29; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing
Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. XXX (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://works.bepress.com/david_reiss/25. Thanks to Phil Tucker for superb research assistance.

1

market the envy of other nations for quite some time, the two companies took on
monstrously large lives of their own that well surpassed their original purpose. It would
take the greatest financial crisis of our lifetime, and a bailout to be measured in the
hundreds of billions of dollars, before Fannie and Freddie’s extraordinarily privileged
status would be seriously challenged.
Congress has a long history of relying upon GSEs to spur private investment.
Indeed, the special privileges accorded a GSE are variants on the longstanding
government practice of spurring private investment in various arenas by granting some
privilege or monopoly power to a party that could infuse the activity with needed capital
or bring focused attention to it. For example, government-granted monopolies can take
the form of a charter granting a monopoly on trade, such as the one granted by Queen
Elizabeth I to the English East India Company in 1600 in order to increase English trade
with Asian nations. They can take the form of a system such as that governing American
patents, granting patent-holders the sole right to exploit a patent for a certain period in
order to encourage innovation. Or they can take the form of a regulated natural
monopoly, like a utility company, that is regulated not only to protect consumers from
monopoly pricing but also to ensure that the company can make a fair return on its
investment.

Fannie and Freddie Create the Modern Secondary Mortgage Market
Mortgages have always been bought and sold by investors, but until relatively
recently, the secondary mortgage market has been an informal arrangement. The
introduction of residential mortgage-backed securities in the 1970s changed that; once
2

mortgages are converted into residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), they can
be easily traded on the secondary market with comparatively few transaction costs. In
the simplest terms, this is how it works:
1. Borrowers get mortgages from lenders in the primary market;
2. primary market lenders then sell these mortgages to secondary mortgage
market firms and use the proceeds to originate more mortgages in the
primary market; and
3. the secondary mortgage market firms then sell securities backed by the
mortgages that they purchased to investors and use the proceeds of the
sale to purchase more mortgages from primary market lenders.
In the late 1970s, RMBS securitization took off as traditional lenders could not
keep up with the demand for home mortgages. The most important factor in the
development of the modern secondary mortgage market has been the creation of Fannie
and Freddie. While Fannie Mae had created a secondary market for government
guaranteed and insured residential mortgage loans in the 1930s, the broad secondary
market began in earnest with the chartering of Freddie Mac in 1970 and the decision to
allow both GSEs to purchase and securitize conventional mortgages as well as
government-insured or guaranteed mortgages.
Unlike nearly every other financial institution in the 1970s, Fannie and Freddie’s
businesses were not geographically restricted and they could develop a truly national
market for mortgages. As the dominant purchasers of residential mortgages, these GSEs
have effectively standardized prime residential mortgages by promulgating buying
guidelines. Such standardization has led to an increase in the liquidity and attractiveness
of mortgages as investments to a broad array of investors.
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After Fannie and Freddie established the secondary mortgage market as a
profitable enterprise, investment in RMBS exploded again as institutional investors
entered the market. Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, non-federal-related issuers,
such as commercial banks and mortgage companies, began to issue RMBS. These
Aprivate label@ RMBS are issued without the type of guarantee that Fannie or Freddie
would give, and they are typically backed by subprime and/or jumbo loans.

The Foundation of the Fannie/Freddie Business Model is Their Regulatory Privilege
Fannie and Freddie have two primary lines of business. First, they help mortgage
originators package their mortgages into RMBS by providing credit guarantees for those
securities in return for a fee paid to the GSE. The credit guarantees help maintain a stable
and liquid market for RMBS. Second, the two companies raise capital by issuing debt
securities and use those funds to purchase mortgages and related securities. Because of
the privileges provided to them as government sponsored enterprises, Fannie and Freddie
have been able to profit greatly from this second line of business.
By statute, Fannie and Freddie’s operations are limited to the “conforming” sector
of the mortgage market, which is made up of mortgages that do not exceed an annually
adjusted threshold. Loans that exceed the loan amount limit in a given year are known as
“jumbo” loans. Most of the remainder of the RMBS market belongs to Aprivate label@
firms which securitize (i) jumbo mortgages and (ii) subprime mortgages that Fannie and
Freddie cannot or choose not to guarantee or purchase for their own portfolio. The two
companies effectively have no competition in the conforming sector of the residential
mortgage market because of advantages granted to them by the federal government in
4

their charters. The most significant of these advantages has been the federal
government’s implied (and, since their bailout, not-so-implied) guarantee of their debt
obligations. The guarantee allowed Fannie and Freddie to borrow funds more cheaply
than its fully-private competitors. They then can make money on the spread between
their low cost of funds and what they must pay for the mortgage-related investments in
their portfolios.

Fannie and Freddie and the Credit Crisis
Fannie and Freddie are extraordinarily large companies: together, they own or
guarantee more than forty percent of all the residential mortgages in the United States.
As of early 2009, the two companies had a combined $5.36 trillion in mortgage-related
obligations, which is of roughly the same magnitude as the $5.81 trillion of federal
government debt held by the public at that time.
As the two companies have grown immense, numerous commentators and
government officials called for their reform. However, in combining elements of public
instrumentalities and private companies, public-private hybrids like Fannie and Freddie
can assert outsized influence in Washington. Fannie and Freddie’s powerful lobbying
forces have kept these reformers mostly at bay.
As a result, Fannie and Freddie continued to grow at a rapid rate through the early
2000s, until they were each hit by accounting scandals. In response to those scandals,
Congress and the two companies’ regulators began to take various steps to limit their
growth. But once they stabilized in 2007, the current credit crisis commenced and their
market share began to increase once again as other lenders could not raise capital to lend
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to borrowers. Because of their government guarantee, Fannie and Freddie were thought
to be well situated in a landscape where other lenders began to fail and the secondary
market for subprime mortgages dried up. Some prominent financial analysts suggested
that Fannie and Freddie could easily ride out the turmoil in the mortgage markets. Even
more, some commentators were arguing that Fannie and Freddie would be able to bail out
other mortgage market players by buying additional mortgages.
As Fannie and Freddie’s star began to appear ascendant, troubling accounts of
possible losses started to emerge: their underwriting models had been too optimistic and
had not accounted for the possibility of severe reductions in housing prices across the
nation. Further, the two industry giants had much more exposure to the problems in the
toxic subprime and Alt-A portions of the mortgage market than they had let on in their
public disclosures. These fears were confirmed soon thereafter, as Fannie and Freddie
began to report very large losses. These losses meant that Fannie and Freddie did not
have the capital to expand their role in the mortgage markets and that their political star
began its fall once again.
Because of their poor underwriting, the two companies started posting quarterly
losses in 2007 that ran into the billions of dollars, with larger losses on the horizon. As a
result, they were having trouble complying with the capital requirements set by their
regulator. Their problems began to spiral out of the control along with those of the rest of
the financial sector until then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson. Jr. asked that
Congress give the Treasury the authority to take over the two companies if they were not
able to meet their financial obligations. Congress, with remarkable alacrity, passed the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 which granted that power to the Treasury.
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Within days of the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, Fannie
and Freddie faced demands to raise more capital, pressures that they would not be able to
meet. Within a few weeks, the markets were expecting the federal government to bail out
the two companies. And within a couple of months, Paulson announced that he was
placing the two companies in conservatorship because they were not able to raise the
capital they needed to continue operating. Throughout the credit crisis, their reported
losses have only continued to increase.

Fannie and Freddie Are Generating a Poor Return on the Nation’s Investment
Fannie and Freddie have attempted to justify their existence by pointing to the
benefits they provide to the American public, primarily: (1) offering systemic stability
and liquidity to the market; (2) increasing the supply of affordable housing; (3) increasing
consumer protection in the residential market; and (4) lowering the overall interest rate
for homeowners.
These claims have been contradicted to a great extent, however, by independent
research as well as by recent events. First, during the crisis Fannie and Freddie provided
only limited stability and liquidity before full-scale government intervention was required
to bail them out. Second, while Fannie and Freddie typically do meet minimal
affordable housing goals set forth by the government, a number of studies have indicated
they hit their target by cannibalizing other federal programs and are not particularly
effective in this regard when compared to other financial institutions. Third, in the field
of consumer protection, Fannie and Freddie’s reputation also took a blow when it became
clear that, while refusing to directly securitize mortgages born of predatory lending, they
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readily bought up suspect subprime and Alt A RMBS issued by other companies.
Finally, Fannie and Freddie’s highly touted impact on the interest rate for homeowners
amounts to a modest reduction for the typical borrower. Considering the extraordinary
profits received via Fannie and Freddie’s government-granted privileges, this is not an
extraordinary benefit to the average homeowner, one that is measured in the tens of
dollars a month. This is particularly true when compared to the price tag for the taxpayer
bailout of the two companies which is being measured in the hundreds of billions of
dollars. This has turned out to be a disastrous trade-off for the American public.
Budgetary implications of the government’s guarantee provide an additional
argument against Fannie and Freddie’s special relationship with the federal government.
First, the cost of the government’s guarantee has been hidden because it has been offbudget—if the government had to quantify and account for this contingent liability in the
federal budget, it would trigger debt ceiling limits and materially reduce Congress’ ability
to increase net spending. Second, the cost of the guarantee is particularly difficult to
quantify because it depends on the companies’ ever-changing exposure to mortgage
obligations. Finally, the cost of the guarantee is not capped by the federal government,
given that the federal government has not imposed any meaningful limits on Fannie and
Freddie’s growth.

Conclusion
The federal government’s special treatment of Fannie and Freddie is an
extraordinary regulatory privilege in terms of its absolute value, its impact on its
competitors and its cost to taxpayers. The main problem with GSEs is well-documented:
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they take on a life of their own and can survive well after they have achieved the
purposes for which they are created. GSEs should, as a general rule, be created with a
sunset clause that would ensure that they would expire once they achieve their
Congressionally-mandated goal. Unfortunately, this is almost never done.
The typical result of poor GSE design is that the GSE ends up driving much of the
legislative and regulatory agenda regarding their own fates. Fannie and Freddie reflect
what is worst in GSE design. After fulfilling their purpose of creating a national
mortgage market, they have taken on monstrously large lives of their own. With Fannie
and Freddie, and our nation, at a crossroads, Congress should seize the opportunity to
terminate their GSE privileges and convert them to fully private status. Congress should
also enact appropriate financial regulation, consumer protection legislation and affordable
housing programs to fill the breach that a fully-privatized Fannie and Freddie would
leave behind. And Congress should remember the lessons of Fannie and Freddie when it
considers using the GSE as a tool of government in the future.
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